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Abstract 
Recent events in North Africa and the Mediterranean have had consequences in terms of human mobility, 
and are putting the foundations and components of EU’s migration policy under strain. The forthcoming 
European Council summit of 23-24 June 2011 is expected to determine ‘the orientations for further work’ 
under the Polish Presidency and the next JHA Trio Presidency Programme for the EU’s policies on cross-
border migration in the Mediterranean and internal mobility within the scope of the Schengen regime.  
This paper constitutes a contribution to current and future EU policy discussions and responses on 
migration, mobility and security. It provides a synthesised selection of recommendations in these domains 
resulting from the research conducted by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Section of the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) during the last nine years of work.  
This Policy Brief argues that for the EU’s Global Approach to Migration to be able to satisfactorily address 
its unfinished elements and policy incoherencies, the Union needs to devise and develop common policy 
strategies focused on: first, new enforcement and independent evaluation mechanisms on the 
implementation of the European law on free movement, borders and migration, and the compatibility of EU 
member states and EU agencies’ actions with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. And second, the 
development of a kind of cooperation (dialogue) with third states that goes beyond security-centred 
priorities and that is solidly based on facilitating human mobility, consolidating fundamental rights and the 
general principles of the rule of law upon which the EU legal system is founded. 
The CEPS ‘Liberty and Security in Europe’ publication series offers the views and critical reflections of 
CEPS researchers and external collaborators on key policy discussions surrounding the construction 
of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The series encompasses policy-oriented and 
interdisciplinary academic studies and commentary about the internal and external implications of 
Justice and Home Affairs policies inside Europe and elsewhere throughout the world. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal 
capacity and not to any institution with which they are associated. This publication may be 
reproduced or transmitted in any form for non-profit purposes only and on the condition that the 
source is fully acknowledged.  
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The EU’s Dialogue on Migration, Mobility 
and Security with the Southern 
Mediterranean under scrutiny 
Filling the Gaps in the Global Approach 
to Migration 
 
Sergio Carrera
* 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, June 2011 
1.  Setting the scene 
Migration is now at the heart of EU policy debate. The events in North Africa and the 
Mediterranean are not only testing the efficiency of Europe’s migration policies, but also the 
legitimacy of the political elements of European integration and the foundations of the EU’s 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ).  
In addition to the EU’s capacity to publicly demonstrate that it is ‘doing something’ to respond 
to the dilemmas surrounding human movements across the Mediterranean and into (and within) 
‘Schengenland’, the main challenge for the Union remains its capacity: first, to provide common 
policy responses beyond (in)security-related agendas and in full compliance with the rule of law 
and fundamental rights standards; and second, to address the implications of the reactions by 
certain European leaders on the reintroduction of internal border controls and anti-immigration 
policies.  
The political climate across Europe is currently not the most favourable one in which to address 
these dilemmas. Several EU member state governments are retreating into nationalism and 
populism in their politics of migration. This nationalism, tinged by ideas and rhetoric usually 
attributed to far right (extremist) national parties, is throwing into question the existing norms 
and principles upon which the EU is founded. It is challenging the Union’s added value in terms 
of upholding the rights and freedoms of non-EU nationals on the move. 
What have the EU’s responses been so far to the events in the southern Mediterranean and 
inside Europe as regards human mobility?  
The political discourses expressed at the highest EU levels have been consistent on the need for 
‘more Europe, not less’. Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström has indeed 
appealed for a strong EU leadership that “can stand up against populist and simplistic solutions” 
and aiming at “strengthening existing rules, and not to undermine them” through “long-term 
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measures based on the values of the respect for law and the respect of international conventions 
and, not though a short-term approach limited to border control”.
1 
A similar line has been followed by the President of the Commission, José Manuel Durão 
Barroso, who in his speech to the European Parliament on 10 May 2011 underlined the 
necessity to address and strengthen the shortcomings of Schengen not to “give argument to the 
populists or the extremists, sometimes to the xenophobes that want to put into question the great 
‘acquis communautaire’ in this area”.
2 
The specific policy proposals presented by the Directorate General for Home Affairs of the 
Commission were outlined in two Communications ‘on migration’
3 (hereinafter referred to as 
the Migration Communication) and on “a dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the 
southern Mediterranean countries” (hereinafter referred to as the Dialogue Communication).
4 
These, along with other controversial member states’ ideas, such as those included in the joint 
letter from Silvio Berlusconi and Nicolas Sarkozy to Herman Van Rompuy and Barroso calling 
for “new possibilities” for re-establishing internal border controls “in case of exceptional 
difficulties in the management of common external borders”,
5 were part of the discussions of 
the latest Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting of 9/10 June 2011.
6 They will be also 
among the most sensitive items for debate in the upcoming European Council summit of 23/24 
June 2011 in Brussels, which is expected to set “orientations for further work” in the context of 
EU’s policy on mobility, borders and migration.
7 These issues will continue to be key priorities 
for the upcoming Polish Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2011, as well as in the scope 
of next JHA Trio Presidency Programme.
8 
This Policy Brief is therefore intended as a contribution to current and future discussions on the 
EU’s policy responses addressing cross-border mobility in the Mediterranean and internal 
movements inside Europe as a consequence of the democratic uprisings and violence in North 
Africa. It provides a selection of policy recommendations resulting from the research conducted 
by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Section of the Centre for European Policy Studies 
                                                      
1 C. Malmström (2011), A better management of migration to the EU, Press conference on 
communication on migration, Brussels, 4 May 2011, Speech/11/310. 
2 J.M.D. Barroso (2011), Migration flows and asylum and their impact on Schengen, European 
Parliament, Strasbourg, 10 May 2011, Speech/11/322.  
3 Commission Communication on Migration, COM(2011) 248 final, Brussels, 4.5.2011. Refer also to the 
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
Joint Communication, A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern 
Mediterranean, COM (2011) 200 final, Brussels, 8 March 2011. 
4 Commission Communication, A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern 
Mediterranean countries, COM(2011) 292/3, Brussels, 24 May 2011. Refer also to the European 
Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint 
Communication, A new response to a changing neighbourhood, Com(2011)303, Brussels, 25 May 2011. 
5 The full text of the joint letter is available from the website of the Italian ministry of foreign affairs 
http://www.esteri.it/MAE/IT/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Approfondimenti/2011/04/20110426_ItaliaFr
ancia.htm 
6 Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on Borders, Migration and Asylum, 3096
th Justice and Home 
Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 9 and 10 June 2011. 
7 Council of the European Union, European Council (23-24 June 2011) – Annotated Draft Agenda, 
9786/11, Brussels, 17 May 2011. Conseil Européen, Le Président, Lettre du président Herman Van 
Rompuy au Président Nicolas Sarkozy concernant la situation migratoire dans la région de la 
Méditerranée, Bruxelles, le 11 mai 2011, PCE 0108/11. 
8 See the new European Council website on a Resource Centre on Free Movement and Migration at 
http://www.eucouncilfiles.eu  THE EU’S DIALOGUE ON MIGRATION, MOBILITY & SECURITY WITH THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 3 
(CEPS) over the last few years. The Brief starts by outlining the dilemmas characterising the 
EU’s Global Approach to Migration and the priorities guiding the Union’s policy responses to 
human mobility from North Africa and inside the Schengen territory in section 2. Section 3 
follows with a package of recommendations that aim to overcome current policy incoherencies 
affecting the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and facilitate common European responses on 
mobility that are compliant with fundamental rights and European freedoms as well as the 
general principles rule of law upon which European integration is founded. 
2.  The EU’s Global Approach to Migration: Human rights and rule of law 
dilemmas 
As with previous crises and dramatic events (inside and outside Europe), the recent and ongoing 
phenomena in the Mediterranean have opened up new opportunities for ‘more Europe’. Beyond 
the ambitions expressed by the European Commission in its various press releases and 
communications, the question that remains open is the kind of Europe that will be actually 
‘delivered’ in the months and years to come in the domain of mobility, and its relationship with 
the rule of law and the rights and liberties of individuals on the move. 
The movements of people triggered by the revolutions and war in the southern Mediterranean 
region have revealed the ‘unfinished elements’ and vulnerabilities in the current configurations 
and premises delineating European policies and approaches on migration, mobility and borders.  
During the last twelve years the Union’s responses in these areas have prioritised the security of 
the Union and its member states, through measures principally intended to address irregular 
immigration (e.g. through return, readmission and criminalisation) and strengthening external 
border controls and surveillance (e.g. the EU border agency Frontex and surveillance 
technologies). Since 2005, the EU formally subscribed to the goal of developing a ‘Global 
Approach to Migration’ combining not only measures “effectively combating irregular 
immigration” but also those focused on “better organising legal migration” and “maximising the 
positive impact of migration on development”.
9  
Nevertheless, the Commission has encountered a number of obstacles as it translates its 
ambitions in these two policy dimensions (especially the one on ‘legal migration’) into legally 
binding (European law) instruments. The nationalism and intergovernmentalism practised by 
certain EU member states representatives on migration politics have constituted two decisive 
‘blocking factors’ to the accomplishment of the agreed ‘global’ policy goals beyond insecurity 
restrictive measures. In the future, the above-mentioned populist and anti-immigration agendas 
spreading across European governments can  only be expected to reinforce these barriers.  
The ways in which the Global Approach to Migration has evolved over the last few years have 
resulted in a number of weaknesses and gaps concerning its actual scope, fundamentals and the 
forms it takes, which we shall now explore. These deficits also apply to the majority of the 
short, medium and long-term policy measures that have been outlined in the Commission 
Communications ‘on migration’ and ‘a dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the 
southern Mediterranean countries’. Among others, the following weaknesses can be identified: 
                                                      
9 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 15 and 16 December, 2005, SN 
15914/01/05, 30.12.2005. Commission Communication, The global approach to migration one year on: 
Towards a comprehensive European migration policy, COM(2006) 735 final, Brussels, 30.11.2006. 
European Commission (2007) Communication on applying the global approach to migration to the eastern 
and south-eastern regions neighbouring the European Union, COM(2007) 247 final, Brussels, 16 May. 4 | SERGIO CARRERA 
2.1 Soft  law 
The tools by which the Global Approach has been put into practice make increasing use of (soft) 
law or ‘policy’ (EU coordination) instruments, such as ‘Mobility Partnerships’. The latter have 
been presented at EU level as one of the key or ‘crucial’ (long-term) responses to events in the 
Mediterranean. The EU is planning to develop Mobility Partnerships with several southern 
Mediterranean countries and primarily with Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt.
10 The partnerships are 
conceived as “a long-term framework based on political dialogue and operational 
cooperation”.
11 
Mobility Partnerships are political declarations that fall outside the classical remits of European 
law or international law. They need to be seen as an experimental method of external 
governance on migration management as they are not enforceable (legally binding) upon the EU 
member states. They aim to move Europeanisation forward through a kind of ‘policy 
coordination’, allowing for a great degree of flexibility and differentiation in terms of EU 
member states’ participation and actual content or material scope.  
The ‘softness’ characterising these tools might be seen as a clear response by the Commission to 
calm the strong intergovernmental sentiments in certain EU member states concerning the 
division of competences on labour immigration, which continue to be contested. However, this 
very softness makes it a challenging endeavour for the Commission to guarantee a common and 
coherent European policy in their scope and implementation.  
These declarations do not benefit either from the application of the basic rule of law or the 
institutional general principles (e.g. democratic control by the European Parliament and judicial 
scrutiny by the Court of Justice in Luxembourg) pertaining to the foundations of the EU legal 
system. The added value of the three Mobility Partnerships so far concluded with Moldova, 
Cape Verde and Georgia,
12 and the actual inclusion (and effectiveness) of workable labour 
mobility initiatives and/or ‘circular migration’ projects in their body, is yet to be proved by an 
independent (non-politicised) evaluation and pertinent objective monitoring mechanism. 
2.2  Insecurity and conditionality  
The kind of ‘dialogue and partnership’ that the EU is promising to give to third countries on 
‘migration and mobility’ is one in which the security of the Union and its member states still 
function as the sine qua non. One of the guiding principles of Mobility Partnerships is 
‘conditionality’ and a ‘performance-based approach’ by the partner country involved.
13 The goal 
                                                      
10 According to the Commission “The Dialogue for migration, mobility and security will be launched 
progressively with the Southern Mediterranean countries, including through the development of Mobility 
Partnerships…on this basis, the Commission proposes to start dialogues with Tunisia, Morocco and 
Egypt”. Commission Communication, A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern 
Mediterranean countries, COM(2011) 292/3, Brussels, 24 May 2011, page 11. 
11 Ibid, page 10. 
12 Council of the European Union (2008), Joint declaration on a mobility partnership between the 
European Union and Moldova, 9460/08 Add. 1, 21 May; Council of the European Union (2008) Joint 
declaration on a mobility partnership between the European Union and Cape Verde, 9460/08 Add. 2, 
Brussels, 21 May. Council of the European Union (2009), Joint declaration on a mobility partnership 
between the European Union and Georgia, 16396/09, Brussels, 20 November. For a political evaluation 
see European Commission (2009), Mobility partnerships as a tool of the global approach to migration, 
Commission staff working document, SEC (2009) 1240, Brussels, 18 September. 
13 According to the Communication, A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern 
Mediterranean countries, COM(2011)292, Brussels, 24 May 2011, one of the principles guiding Mobility 
Partnerships is ‘conditionality’ understood as follows: “the expected outcomes of the Dialogue would THE EU’S DIALOGUE ON MIGRATION, MOBILITY & SECURITY WITH THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 5 
for the EU to offer facilitated mobility (visa facilitation agreements) and selected legal (and 
labour) migration is subject to the fulfilment by the third country of a number of conditions that 
come back to the traditional understanding of migration as insecurity (i.e. prioritising return, 
readmission, border controls and Frontex and surveillance technologies), as well as one focused 
on ‘capacity-building measures’ on migration and borders management.  
This is, by way of illustration, evident from the text of the Commission Communication on 
dialogue on migration, mobility and security (2011)292 which states that:  
The increased mobility…will depend on the prior fulfilment of a certain number of 
conditions, aimed at contributing to the creation of a secure environment in which the 
circulation of persons would take place…Specific measures to be implemented can be 
listed … as follows: putting in place voluntary return arrangements, concluding 
readmission agreements with the EU…concluding a working arrangement with 
Frontex, building capacity in the area of integrated border management, document 
security and the fight against organised crime, cooperating in the joint surveillance in 
the Mediterranean sea, including possible cooperation in the context of the EUROSUR 
project, demonstrating willingness to cooperate with the EU…in the field of police and 
judicial cooperation, as well as for the purposes of readmission and extradition...
14 
2.3  A migrant-centred approach? 
The discussions surrounding the Global Approach to Migration have been mainly ‘inter partes’ 
(the states of origin and destination) and have too often relegated the status of the rights, 
interests and voices of migrants. It is to be welcomed that the new Communication on dialogue 
on migration, mobility and security (2011)292 has finally included express references to the 
need for the EU Global Approach to Migration to promote and respect migrants’ rights.
15 Yet 
the actual ways in which this particular dimension is going to materialise in practice in the 
framework of Mobility Partnerships remains to be seen, and will then need careful scrutiny. 
2.4  Human rights  
The impact of certain European migration legislations and border control/surveillance practices 
on the Union’s human rights commitments, and now the set of rights envisaged by the legally 
binding EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, has also been absent from debates. Neither have 
they been accompanied by more solid initiatives and EU enforcement mechanisms 
automatically suspending contested national and EU practices that allegedly damage the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals within the scope of EU border, migration and 
free movement law, or the activities of EU institutions/agencies such as Frontex. The EU does 
not employ independent and objective evaluation systems to scrutinise the lawfulness of the 
daily implementation of these rights-sensitive policies on the ground, and to ensure access by 
individuals to effective remedies in cases of alleged fundamental rights violations.  
                                                                                                                                                            
depend of the efforts and progress made in all areas (migration, mobility and security), and will take into 
account also progress made in governance-related areas”, p. 7. 
14 Ibid., p. 10. 
15 The Communication states that one of the goals of Mobility Partnerships is “respecting the fundamental 
rights of any migrants, including those that are nationals of third countries”. Ibid, p. 8. It also states that 
the EU Global Approach to Migration aims at “(4) the promotion and respect of migrants’ rights, both of 
nationals of the partner countries and of third-country nationals transiting through their territories”, p. 8. 6 | SERGIO CARRERA 
3.  Policy recommendations for the EU Global Approach to Migration 
The resulting scenario is one where the circulation of people emerging from the democratic 
uprisings in the North African states and the subsequent war in Libya function as a magnifying 
glass that highlights these (and other) failings and unfinished elements in Europe’s immigration 
policy and the Global Approach to Migration. The events in North Africa are prompting the 
Union to face policy dilemmas such as:  
•  Practical ways to ensure full compliance with its own legal and political commitments on 
rule of law and fundamental human rights, especially in the phases of member states’ 
daily implementation of EU borders, free movement and migration law and/or activities 
of EU agencies like Frontex; and 
•  Concrete strategies to build a ‘global’ dialogue and solidarity-based approach with North 
African countries beyond ‘security-related’ priorities and scarce (selective, utilitarian and 
temporary/circular) labour mobility channels in full compliance with the rights and 
interests of migrant workers and meeting basic rule of law principles. 
What should the EU do? The CEPS JHA Section has proposed a number of policy 
recommendations for the Union over the years to address some of the above-mentioned 
weaknesses in Europe’s immigration policy. Some of these have already been taken up by 
several EU policy actors; while others are still relevant and should be taken into account in 
future EU policy interventions. A full list of our publications in which the recommendations 
have been developed in detail is provided in the Annex of this Policy Brief. This section 
provides a selection of recommendations to the EU Global Approach to Migration, and in 
particular to Europe’s policies concerning freedom of movement and fundamental rights, 
borders and migration.  
3.1  Freedom of movement and fundamental rights 
RECOMMENDATION 
The EU should adopt a new freezing mechanism 
The current enforcement mechanisms provided by EU law should be strengthened, 
complemented and further de-politicised. The Roma affair in France during the summer of 2010 
(where thousands of Romanian and Bulgarian nationals of Roma origin living in France were 
expelled by the French authorities), and the more recent Franco-Italian Schengen affair of April 
2011 on the reintroduction of internal border controls and pushing back of hundreds of migrants 
and NGOs representatives have demonstrated that the current EU infringement procedures are 
not sufficient to provide sound and immediate actions when fundamental rights and European 
freedoms (such as the freedom of movement) are threatened by member states’ authorities acts 
or practices.
16 
The CEPS JHA Section has proposed that the EU develop a new (preventive) freezing 
enforcement mechanism.
17 This procedure would aim at guaranteeing that contested policies 
                                                      
16 S. Carrera and A. Faure Atger (2010), L’affaire de Roms: A Challenge to the EU’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, CEPS Liberty and Security Series, Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS: 
Brussels. Refer also to S. Carrera, E. Guild, M. Merlino and J. Parkin (2011), A Race against Solidarity: 
The Schengen Regime and the Franco-Italian Affair, CEPS Liberty and Security Series, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, CEPS: Brussels. 
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and practices by EU member states and/or EU agencies (such as joint operations coordinated by 
Frontex) falling within the remits of EU law and fundamental rights would be automatically 
‘frozen’ in cases of actual, suspected or imminent breaches of fundamental rights and/or 
freedoms of individuals, while the legality of the case is being examined in detail.  
For such an ex ante procedure to be fully effective, careful attention should be paid to ensuring 
its overall objectivity, impartiality and democratic accountability. The procedure would be 
activated by the European Commission (on its own initiative or that of the European Parliament) 
on the basis of evidence provided by impartial actors such as the EU Agency on Fundamental 
Rights (FRA) or a new external network of independent and interdisciplinary experts/academics 
working in close cooperation with civil society organisations based in the different member 
states. 
The operability of this precautionary procedure could lead to the launch of accelerated 
infringement proceedings against the EU member state(s) in question and to an expedited 
procedure (similar to the current urgent preliminary ruling procedure for AFSJ-related policies) 
before the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. This would consist of the application of a shorter 
period for the parties involved to submit statements of case or written observations and/or for 
the written phase of the case to be omitted.  
In addition, the Court of Justice in Luxembourg could be also granted similar powers to those 
held by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg under the so-called Rule 
39 procedure. The latter allows the ECtHR to adopt interim measures where there is an 
imminent risk of irreparable damage to human rights by a state party. Rule 39 means the 
effective freezing of the state party’s practices while the case is under consideration. Such a 
possibility would be most pertinent in light of the imminent EU signing up to the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 
The proposal for a freezing mechanism has been already welcomed by some EU civil society 
actors such as ECAS
18 and EU consultative bodies such as the European Economic and Social 
Committee.
19 It has also been included in the European Parliament (EP) Report on the Situation 
of Fundamental Rights in the European Union (2009) of 1 December 2010, which stated that the 
EP: 
[b]elieves that EU action should not only address violations of fundamental rights after 
they have happened, but should also seek to prevent them; consequently calls for a 
reflection on mechanisms for early detection of potential violations of fundamental 
rights in the EU and in its member states, temporary freezing of the measures which 
constitute such violations, accelerated legal procedures for determining if a measure is 
contrary to EU fundamental rights and for sanctions in the event that these measures 
are nonetheless implemented contrary to EU law.
20  
                                                      
18 European Citizen Action Service, ECAS (2011), Hands off our right to move freely around the Union!, 
press release, available at http://www.ecas-citizens.eu/content/view/393/1 Refer also to ECAS (2009), 
Mind the Gap: Towards a Better Enforcement of European Citizens’ Rights of Free Movement, European 
Citizen Action Service, Brussels, December 2009. 
19 Draft Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication on migration 
COM(2011) 248 final, SOC/418, Brussels, 9 June 2011. 
20 European Parliament, Report on the Situation of Fundamental Rights in the European Union (2009) – 
effective implementation after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009/2161(INI), A7-
0344/2010, Rapporteur: Kinga Gal, 1 December 2010, para. 40 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ 
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2010-0344+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN). 8 | SERGIO CARRERA 
The Vice-President of the Commission and Commissioner for Justice, Viviane Reding stated in 
plenary on 14 December 2010 that she had asked her services to explore the possibility of 
applying it. Since then no further follow-up initiatives have been seen.
21 
RECOMMENDATION 
Schengen: The EU should ensure the closer follow-up and monitoring of the 
temporary reintroduction of internal border controls 
The movements of people into Europe from North Africa during the last few months has led to 
the emergence of policy discourses and practices by certain European governments, putting 
under strain the principle of free movement of persons and the foundations of the Schengen 
regime. The JHA CEPS Section recommended that the Schengen system as defined in the 2006 
Schengen Borders Code (SBC) should not be revised on the basis of nationalistic and 
opportunistic reactions that call for wider room for manoeuvre at times of exceptions to the 
general principle of freedom of movement.
22  
The SBC already foresees the possibility for a member state to temporarily reintroduce internal 
border controls in cases where “there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security”. 
This possibility, however, constitutes an ‘exception’ and is firmly embedded in a set of 
procedural requirements and guarantees with which national authorities need to comply. It has 
been used by national authorities about 70 times since the mid 1990s.
23  
The EU should ensure a closer follow-up, monitoring and transparent (democratically 
accountable) system (and record) of EU member states’ reintroduction of internal border 
checks, and their compatibility with the procedural criteria envisaged by the SBC and 
fundamental EU freedoms envisaged by the Treaties and secondary legislation. Particular focus 
should be placed on assessing the proportionality, adequacy and necessity of the grounds upon 
which the control of internal borders has been justified, as well as their effectiveness. The 
European Parliament, and national parliaments, should play a central role in the scrutiny of any 
national practice that derogates the freedom of movement principle.  
The Commission’s proposal, as originally highlighted in the previously referred Communication 
on Migration COM(2011) 248 of 4
th May, for a new coordinated EU mechanism to allow for the 
reinstatement of internal border controls under ‘exceptional circumstances and truly critical 
situations’ is in our view problematic on two main fronts:
24  
                                                      
21 Refer to the debate at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+ 
CRE+20101214+SIT+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN: Reding stated that  
…There is this idea of a ‘freezing mechanism’, as the rapporteur called it, this prevention system 
where one would intervene with regard to a measure being taken in a member state up to the 
point at which it is implemented. I have asked my experts to analyze this, and the institutional 
issues that such a mechanism raises are very complex. For the time being, although we will have 
to continue the analysis and see what is really happening, it seems to me that there is no legal 
basis to act in such a way and that a change in the Treaty would be needed to activate such a 
prevention mechanism. It is an attractive idea. We will carry on looking for a mechanism that 
could be used without changing the Treaty so as to deal with the most pressing issues. 
22 S. Carrera, E. Guild, M. Merlino and J. Parkin (2011), A Race against Solidarity: The Schengen Regime 
and the Franco-Italian Affair, CEPS Liberty and Security Series, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
CEPS: Brussels. 
23 Refer to Appendix ‘Reintroduction of Internal Border Controls’, Ibid., pp. 23-26. 
24 The Communication stated, in rather vague language that:  THE EU’S DIALOGUE ON MIGRATION, MOBILITY & SECURITY WITH THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 9 
First, the operability of an EU-coordinated instrument designed to react to emergency scenarios 
can be questioned. It appears unlikely that this mechanism could be swift enough to address 
what member states’ collectively identify as situations calling for ‘immediate action’. The 
conditions surrounding its activation, such as the existence of ‘critical or emergency situations’ 
and a ‘serious threat to public security’, suggest that in practice it would be rarely used, like the 
mechanism provided by the Temporary Protection Directive
25 designed to deal with situations 
of ‘massive influxes’ (or imminent ones) of displaced individuals from third countries in need of 
protection, which has not been used even once since its adoption in 2001. 
Second, given that the initiative is liable to be interpreted as a concession to appease Presidents 
Sarkozy and Berlusconi, the proposal could set a precedent for opportunistic politicians who 
wish to evade their EU legal commitments in the scope of the EU borders and migration 
legislation. It may also unnecessarily re-open discussions inside the Council on already existing 
standards and procedures and in this way enable a watering down of current procedural (rule of 
law) principles set by the SBC. 
3.2 Borders 
RECOMMENDATION 
The EU should perform an independent, impartial and effective evaluation of 
national and EU external border control practices 
There is a ‘knowledge gap’ in the ways in which the provisions, administrative guarantees and 
fundamental rights foreseen in the SBC and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights are applied 
along the EU’s common external borders. The actions of national border authorities and Frontex 
(the EU border agency) to date are not being adequately scrutinised. The grey areas 
characterising practices on border control and the return of irregular immigrants across Europe 
(and the responsibilities of relevant domestic and EU law enforcement agencies) seriously 
undermine general democratic principles of accountability and scrutiny. They also make access 
to justice and effective remedies difficult for individuals. 
There are several factors calling for the development of a new independent and politically 
accountable evaluation system at EU level of external borders policies and (control and 
surveillance) border practices, in short: first, the complexity of the EU’s external borders; 
second, the blurred and narrow picture of competent national authorities involved in border 
                                                                                                                                                            
A mechanism must also be put in place to allow the Union to handle situations where either a 
member state is not fulfilling its obligations to control its section of the external border, or 
where a particular portion of the external border comes under unexpected and heavy pressure 
due to external events. A coordinated Community-based response by the Union in critical 
situations would undoubtedly increase trust among member states. It would also reduce recourse 
to unilateral initiatives by member states to temporarily reintroduce internal border 
controls….Such a mechanism may therefore need to be introduced, allowing for a decision at 
European level defining which member states would exceptionally reintroduce internal border 
control and for how long. The mechanism should be used as a last resort in truly critical 
situations,…The Commission is exploring the feasibility of introducing such a mechanism, and 
may present a proposal to this effect shortly, p. 8.  
Refer to S. Carrera and J. Parkin (2011), Schengen under strain: An opportunity for more, not less 
Europe, CEPS News June 2011, Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS: Brussels. 
25 Council Directive EC/2001/55 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a 
mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between member states 
in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, 20 July 2001, OJ L212/12, 7.8.2001. 10 | SERGIO CARRERA 
controls and surveillance; third, the deficits still affecting the practical implementation of 
external border controls; and fourth, the nuances in the areas of responsibility (between 
domestic border authorities, third states and Frontex) and access to justice (fundamental rights 
and administrative guarantees envisaged by the SBC) by individuals.
26  
The CEPS JHA Section has regularly called for the need to ensure a better impartial monitoring 
of the compliance between EU external border controls and EU borders law and the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. Our research has underlined the need to improve the current 
(intergovernmental, obscure and methodologically flawed) Schengen evaluation mechanism in 
order to ensure that the management of the external borders are firmly founded on the rule of 
law and that the SBC is duly implemented across Europe’s external borders.
27 This would be 
feasible in light of the possibility expressly stipulated in the new Article 70 of the TFEU.
28  
This idea goes in line (to varying degrees) with the European Commission’s proposals for 
ensuring “a clear system of Schengen governance” and the initiative to revise the Schengen 
evaluation mechanism “on a Community approach with participation of experts from member 
states, Frontex and led by the Commission”.
29 In the Commission’s view “the proposed 
mechanism would ensure more transparency and improve the follow-up of shortcomings 
identified during the experts’ evaluations”.
30 However, these Commission initiatives would still 
fail to ensure the necessary degree of independence of the evaluation and the proper daily 
monitoring of external border practices in light of EU law and the SBC.  
The JHA Section has recommended that an evaluation mechanism of such a nature be 
accompanied by the setting-up of a permanent European network of (interdisciplinary) 
academics and/or experts, which could offer independent expertise and analysis focused on the 
fundamental rights and rule of law aspects related to the AFSJ, and more concretely the national 
implementation and compliance of EU borders law.
31 This would be, in our opinion, an effective 
way to ensure that the EU develops ‘evidence-based policy making’ in these domains. This 
should be further accompanied by a permanent monitoring system focused on the full and 
                                                      
26 S. Carrera (2010), Towards a Common European Border Service?, CEPS Working Document No. 331, 
Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS, Brussels.  
27 See S. Carrera, D. Bigo and E. Guild (2008), What Future for the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice? Recommendations on EU Migration and Borders Policies in a Globalising World, CEPS Policy 
Brief No. 156, Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS: Brussels; See also S. Carrera, E. Guild and A. 
Faure Atger (2009), Challenges and Prospects for the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: 
Recommendations to the European Commission for the Stockholm Programme, CEPS Working 
Document No. 313, Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS,  Brussels.  
28 Article 70 TFEU states that:  
The Council may, on a proposal from the Commission, adopt measures laying down the 
arrangements whereby member states, in collaboration with the Commission, conduct objective 
and impartial evaluation of the implementation of the Union policies referred to in this Title by 
member states’ authorities, in particular in order to facilitate full application of the principle of 
mutual recognition. The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be informed of the 
content and results of the evaluation. 
29 Commission Communication on Migration, COM(2011) 248 final, Brussels, 4.5.2011. 
30 Ibid., p. 8. 
31 S. Carrera, D. Bigo and E. Guild (2009), The Challenge Project: Final Policy Recommendations on the 
Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security, CHALLENGE Research Paper No. 16, Centre 
for European Policy Studies, CEPS: Brussels; S. Carrera, E. Guild and A. Faure-Atger (2009), Challenges 
and Prospects for the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Recommendations to the European 
Commission for the Stockholm Programme, CEPS Working Document No. 313, Centre for European 
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uniform application of the SBC on border checks and surveillance activities, which we now 
enter into analysing in the context of Frontex. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Frontex should be subject to independent and democratic 
scrutiny/accountability 
One of the most visible EU responses to the southern Mediterranean events has been the EU 
border agency Frontex Joint Operation EPN HERMES Extension 2011, which has aimed at 
providing assistance to the Italian authorities in controlling vessels and identifying the 
nationality and access to asylum for the protection of those arriving onto Italian territory. The 
operation, which has been running since 20 February 2011, has mainly consisted of the 
deployment of around 20 experts on screening and debriefing from different EU member states 
to several immigrant detention centres in Italy, as well as assistance in maritime surveillance.
32 
Since 2007, the JHA CEPS Section has underlined the deficits inherent in Frontex activities, 
especially those joint operations taking place in maritime territories (inside the EU or on high 
seas) as well as those engaging in the diversion of boats (‘push backs’) through extra-territorial 
border controls in the territories of third countries.
33 We have highlighted the lack of clear and 
solid accountability procedures affecting Frontex’s activities, which only adds to the 
complexities and lack of transparency in the implementation of SBC across the Union’s external 
borders and the allocation of responsibilities in cases of potential fundamental rights and 
administrative guarantees violations.
34  
At present there is still no EU mechanism to scrutinise the impact, added value and 
effectiveness (and proportionality) of Frontex activities and joint operations, or the reliability of 
the risk analysis upon which the latter are based. The democratic oversight of the Agency’s 
tasks by the European Parliament also needs to be significantly enhanced beyond budgetary 
control to cover a proper follow-up and scrutiny of all Frontex activities. 
The JHA CEPS Section has proposed the establishment of a ‘border monitor’ that would be 
competent to carry out a continual evaluation of the border controls and their compatibility with 
the SBC, as well as joint return operations of irregular immigrants.
35 They should be 
independent of Frontex and could be responsible for initiating disciplinary measures in cases of 
improper application of the SBC or misconduct. The border monitor could be also in charge of 
                                                      
32 For detailed information on the HERMES operation refer to www.frontex.europa.eu See Frontex Press 
Release, Frontex Guest Officers sent to work in Italy, 25 February 2011, Warsaw; also Frontex Press 
Release, Update to Joint Operation Hermes 2011, 11 March 2011, Warsaw.  
33 S. Carrera (2007), The EU Border Management Strategy: Frontex and the Challenges of Irregular 
Immigration in the Canary Islands, CEPS Working Document No. 261, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, CEPS, Brussels.  
34 S. Carrera and E. Guild (2010) Joint Operation RABIT 2010’ – FRONTEX Assistance to Greece’s 
Border with Turkey: Revealing the Deficiencies of Europe’s Dublin Asylum System, CEPS Liberty and 
Security in Europe, November 2010. 
35 S. Carrera, E. Guild and K. Groenendijk (2008), Ten Policy Recommendations on Freedom, Security 
and Justice for the European Parliament Elections, CEPS Policy Brief No. 173, October, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, CEPS: Brussels. Refer also to P. Hobbing (2010), “The management of the 
EU’s external borders: from the Customs Union to Frontex and e-borders” in E. Guild, S. Carrera and A. 
Eggenschwiler (eds.) The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Ten Years On: Successes and Future 
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reporting periodically on the application of the SBC.
36 In addition, an accompanying 
recommendation was also made to set up an additional group of officials (fundamental rights 
supervisor/officer) which would be responsible for the evaluation and conduct of inspections 
focused on the protection of fundamental rights as envisaged in the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the SBC.
37 
In February 2010, the European Commission presented a new proposal amending the Frontex 
Regulation, which has since been the subject of sensitive debates and contributions.
38 The 
negotiations on the Frontex Regulation open up an opportunity to introduce new mechanisms 
which would ensure greater accountability and scrutiny of Frontex activities. Input by both the 
Commission and the European Parliament indicate potential positive steps forward. 
Among the main innovative elements put forward by the Commission in the revision of Frontex 
mandate, the Commission proposed that in those coordination activities related to joint return 
operations (by air) of irregular immigrants by EU member states the Agency would need to 
develop a ‘code of conduct’ that would describe:  
common standardised procedures which should simplify the organisation of joint return 
flights and assure return in a humane manner and in full respect for fundamental rights, 
in particular the principles of human dignity, prohibition of torture and of inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, right to liberty and security, the rights to the 
protection of personal data and non discrimination.
39 
The proposal also included the figure of an independent ‘monitor’ of joint return operations that 
would act “from the predeparture phase until the hand-over of the returnees in the country of 
return.”
40 According to the Commission: 
observations of the monitor, which shall cover the compliance with the Code of 
Conduct and in particular fundamental rights, shall be made available to the 
Commission and form part of the internal Final Return Operation Report. In order to 
ensure transparency and a coherent evaluation of the forced-return operations, reports 
of the monitor shall be included in an annual reporting mechanism.
41 
Moreover, the Commission’s proposals involved an obligation to draft an operational plan 
which should address mandatory components such as “the geographical area” of the operation, 
“command and control provisions” and “applicable jurisdiction and maritime law provisions”. 
                                                      
36 S. Carrera (2010), Towards a Common European Border Service?, CEPS Working Document No. 331, 
Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS, Brussels. 
37 Ibid., p. 29.  
38 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 
establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
of the member states of the European Union (FRONTEX), COM(2010) 61 final, Brussels, 24 February 
2010. 
39 Ibid, Article 9, pp. 26-27 of the proposal. 
40 Refer also to Article 8.6 of the Returns Directive which states that “member states shall provide for an 
effective forced-return monitoring system”. Directive 2008/115 on common standards and procedures in 
member states for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, 16 December 2008, OJ L348/98, 
24.12.2008. 
41 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 
establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
of the member states of the European Union (FRONTEX), COM(2010) 61 final, Brussels, 24 February 
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These components may in the future lead to less diluted responsibilities amongst the relevant 
authorities, including Frontex. 
The report adopted by the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament on the Commission’s 
proposal was more ambitious regarding the need to ensure the protection of fundamental rights 
during Frontex activities.
42 The EP proposed the setting up of a Fundamental Rights Advisory 
Board in Frontex that would assist the Frontex director and management board in those matters 
“concerning the Agency's activities having implications for fundamental rights”.
43 The Advisory 
Board would have investigatory competences and the right to make any request for information 
on the compatibility of the Agency’s activities (joint operations, rapid border intervention 
mission or pilot projects) with fundamental rights and “notably the relevant Union law, 
international law and obligations related to international protection.”
44 The Advisory Board 
would consist of representatives from the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and other relevant organisations. Each year, it would draft a report on compliance 
with fundamental rights by Frontex.  
The LIBE Committee also recommended a suspension mechanism for Frontex joint operations, 
rapid border intervention mission or pilot projects “where there are cases of violation of 
fundamental rights and international protection obligations.”
45 It also stated that “no Frontex 
operation may take place under the jurisdiction of any third country”
46 and went further by 
developing the Code of Conduct’s idea, firstly by saying that it should be drafted in cooperation 
with other competent EU or international bodies and organisations, namely the FRA, EASO, 
UNHCR and IOM, and secondly by proposing a general operational Code of Conduct beyond 
joint return.
47 The Code should lay down:  
procedures intended to guarantee respect for fundamental rights, with particular focus 
on unaccompanied minors and vulnerable persons, as well as practical measures to be 
taken for the purpose of identifying persons seeking protection and directing them to 
appropriate facilities.
48 
                                                      
42 European Parliament, Draft Report, on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the member states of the European 
Union (FRONTEX), (COM(2010)0061 – C7-0045/2010 – 2010/0039(COD)), Rapporteur: Simon 
Busuttil, 12.11.2010. 
43 Amendment 102. 
44 Amendment 102. 
45 Amendments 32 and 102.2. 
46 Amendment 92. 
47 Amendments 24 and 81. 
48 Amendment 24. Refer also to Amendment 81 which refers to the need for the Code to ensure the 
implementation of the above-mentioned Article 8.6 of the Returns Directive to provide for “an effective 
forced-return monitoring system to ensure that the return is carried out in full respect for fundamental 
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Finally, another important recommendation put forward by the EP, which is consistent with its 
previous positions on the matter,
49 was the need to strengthen the democratic 
accountability/scrutiny of Frontex activities through the monitoring of its risk analysis and the 
working arrangements and agreements with other EU agencies and third countries. It proposed 
several obligations for Frontex to inform the EP of these activities to that effect.
50 Furthermore, 
the EP proposed that the Frontex executive director be invited to report on the carrying out of 
his/her tasks, “in particular on the general report of the Agency for the previous year, the work 
programme for the coming year and the Agency's multi-annual plan”.
51 
RECOMMENDATION 
No new EU level database to be used until existing security technologies prove 
proportionate, safe and reliable –  
An independent evaluation/inventory and evidence-based approach 
The EU’s AFSJ has been driven by a firm belief in technology as the solution to every 
insecurity and border-related ‘threat’ facing the Union. Little consideration (and ex ante 
examination) has been given however to the ethical implications of security technologies over 
the principle of proportionality and fundamental rights, such as the protection of personal data 
envisaged in Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the right to respect private 
life as interpreted in the context of the Council of Europe, as well as that of non-discrimination 
foreseen in Article 21 of the EU Charter.  
The Migration Communication labels these security and fundamental rights-sensitive policy 
initiatives under the rubric of ‘organised mobility’ and with the aim “to protect and to ensure a 
smooth passage for EU citizens and their family members, and for all third country nationals 
who come to the EU”.
52 The untold dimension is the higher degree of insecurity that this 
‘smoother’ system of technologically-based management of human mobility can exert over the 
liberties and fundamental freedoms of persons on the move.   
The use of security and surveillance technologies has expanded since the early days of 
Schengen cooperation and an ever increasing quantity of data on persons and objects has been 
compiled and exchanged across the member states via several established large-scale IT 
databases and information systems. These include, among others, the Schengen Information 
System (SIS), EURODAC and the Visa Information System (VIS).
53 In addition, the 
Commission announced in February 2008 a package of proposals (the borders package) for the 
development of several new databases and biometric systems for the surveillance of external 
borders and for making border crossings for ‘bona fide’ travelers easier.
54 The Council is now 
expecting a Commission legislative proposal on the European Border surveillance system 
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52 Commission Communication on Migration, COM(2011) 248 final, Brussels, 4.5.2011, Section 3.1 
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(EUROSUR) and a Communication on so-called ‘smart borders’ dealing with the setting up of 
an Entry-Exit System (EES) and a Registered Travellers Programme (RTP), which are expected 
to be quickly followed by concrete legislative proposals.
55   
The CEPS JHA Section has put forward a number of concerns relating to the content and ways 
in which these technological tools are being developed and justified.
 56 These relate, for 
instance, to the use that is made of the data stored therein, the level of access and exchange of 
these sensitive data and the consequences of data inaccuracies. The increasing use of ‘profiling’ 
as a data processing technique constitutes a worrying case in point and risky practice from a 
rights and freedom-of-individuals point of view.
57  
These concerns call for significant revisions of the content, and rules governing access to 
information held on EU level databases so as to ensure their necessity, proportionality, safety 
and reliability. The negative implications of these surveillance policies (identified by EU-funded 
research projects on security technologies)
58 over the rights and freedoms of the entire 
population and especially of vulnerable groups, such as certain (stigmatised) categories of third 
country nationals should be carefully assessed from a human rights and non-discrimination 
point of view.  
No new EU large-scale database should be set up until existing ones are found to be 
proportionate, safe and reliable. Questions of adequacy and proportionality of the flow of 
information need to be addressed in order to challenge the assumption that maximum 
technology is by definition the solution for better security.
59  
Advancing the EU strategy on information management should begin with an independent 
inventory of current policies, tools and institutional structures involved in data exchange in the 
field of security at EU level and their practical implementation, building on the Commission’s 
preliminary mapping exercise undertaken in 2010.
60 Moreover, both DG Justice, Citizenship 
and Fundamental Rights of the European Commission and the FRA should be engaged to 
conduct an in-depth fundamental rights proof-reading of existing and any upcoming database, 
including taking into account the risks implied by their potential inter-operability with other 
large scale databases. 
The democratic accountability of policy-making relating to the development of large-scale EU 
databases must be ensured by allowing all EU institutions to have a proper and informed say in 
the policy processes. The European Parliament and national parliaments should be fully 
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informed of discussions and developments and given sufficient time to scrutinise proposals for 
future EU large-scale IT systems in light of the evaluation of existing ones. Parliamentary 
scrutiny should also focus on the proportionality between budgetary expenditure and the 
necessity and effectiveness of these technology tools and information systems.  
Another recommendation that has been put forward in these areas since 2008 is that of ‘data 
protection by design’ advocated by several data protection authorities and privacy 
commissioners at international level.
61 The latter has become a ‘motto’ across various EU policy 
documents.
62 This principle has also received the support of the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party (which has recommended that it be binding for data controllers, as well as 
technology designers and producers),
63 and the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 
which has considered it as an “element of accountability”.
64  
Our research has recommended that ‘data protection and privacy by design’ should be an 
explicit and integral part of information and security technologies. It should constitute an 
obligatory element in the programming and running of any new and existing databases. This 
principle would allow for automated solutions to data protection requirements since the very 
inception of security technologies, such as the automatic deletion of data at the end of the 
permitted period and other protection elements such as purpose limitation, rules on 
transmission, storage time, information to the data subject, etc. Individuals must indeed be 
adequately protected against the consequences of data inaccuracies or negligent data exchange 
and must be properly informed of their rights.
65 A challenge for the EU remains the clarification 
of the relationship between ‘privacy by design’ and the EU rights of privacy and personal data 
protection, and finding ways to effectively put legal requirements into practice.
66 
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3.3 Migration 
RECOMMENDATION 
Europe’s Labour Immigration policy should be guided by a rights-based 
approach – An Immigration Code 
Among the components of the EU Global Approach to Migration is “better organising legal 
migration”.
67 The EU 2020 Strategy has also identified as one of its priorities for ‘inclusive 
growth’ the need to develop a “forward-looking and comprehensive labour migration policy 
which would respond in a flexible way to the priorities and needs of labour markets”.
68 
Over the last eleven years the EU has striven to develop a common approach to migration 
policy, including mobility for employment-related purposes. This political ambition has faced 
several obstacles, leading to the emergence of a legislative framework characterised by 
fragmentation and obscurity as regards the rights, freedoms and administrative guarantees of 
third country nationals. European immigration law is sectoral in nature, consisting of: first, a 
number of directives regulating the conditions of entry and residence of only certain categories 
of third country nationals (e.g. highly-skilled workers, long-term residents, students, scientists 
and family members); second, three legislative proposals dealing respectively with a single 
permit and common framework of rights, the status of seasonal workers and that of intra-
corporate transferees; and third a number of legal provisions dispersed across other secondary 
legislation acts (for instance in EU asylum law) and association agreements between the EU and 
third countries. 
The CEPS JHA Section has called for a ‘rights-based approach’ to be the driver of Europe’s 
migration policy.
69 The current selective approach to labour migration (purely based on the 
perceived labour market and skills shortages in the member states) should be replaced by one 
where the rights, interests and voices of all migrant workers, regardless of their immigration 
status, are placed at the heart of common European policy responses. Migrants should not be 
seen as economic units at the service of the state and the market, but rather as participants, 
residents, human rights holders and citizens-in-waiting. Such an approach should go along with 
the creation of an exhaustive and consolidated (coherent) regulatory framework guaranteeing 
common cohesive goals and strategies, both internally and when engaging in international 
relations with third states.  
We have recommended that the EU develop a labour migration regime characterised by 
openness, flexibility, efficiency and compatibility with other policies.
70 The existing fragmented 
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legal framework calls for sound consolidation and legal certainty. The CEPS JHA Section has 
proposed that the EU support an independent inventory of the current framework covering the 
rights and standards in the field of labour market access, rights and conditions for TCNs, which 
would also evaluate the dilemmas faced in implementation at the domestic level as well as the 
added value of the EU’s intervention in this domain.
71 In its 2010 Action Plan implementing the 
Stockholm Programme titled “Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s 
citizens”
72 the European Commission presented the initiative of an “Immigration Code”
73 which 
would mean the 
consolidation of legislation in the area of legal immigration taking into account the 
evaluation of the existing legislation, needs for simplification and where necessary (an 
extension of) the existing provisions to categories of workers currently not covered by 
EU legislation. 
The current state of policy dispersion and incoherency could indeed be potentially overcome by 
an Immigration Code subject to a number of conditions:
74 
1.  It should be guided by the principles of fair and equal treatment between EU citizens and 
third country nationals, as originally emphasised in the 1999 Tampere European Council 
Conclusions/Programme;
75  
2.  The personal scope would extend beyond those labelled as ‘legally residing third country 
nationals’ and also cover undocumented migrants;  
3.  The codification would not lead to lowering already existing legal standards and rights.  
The Code could be also an opportunity for the EU to become a more active promoter of the UN, 
Council of Europe and International Labour Organisation legal (ILO) instruments and 
conventions protecting migrants' human rights amongst EU member states. It could also include 
provisions aiming at ensuring a better national implementation of these already existing human 
rights standards and building closer partnerships with these (and other) international, regional 
and European actors. 
The CEPS JHA Section has equally underlined the importance of ensuring a democratic and 
participatory policy process by incorporating the knowledge and practical experiences of 
practitioners representing civil society, immigrants’ organisations, local and regional authorities 
(cities) and social partners (trade unions and employers’ organisations) in the 
definition/identification, consultation, implementation and (ex post) evaluation of the 
immigration policy priorities, legislative acts and financial frameworks.
76 Existing platforms 
such as the European Integration Forum and proposals like the European platform for dialogue 
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on labour immigration constitute a step in the right direction. That notwithstanding, their 
competences and inputs should be significantly strengthened, especially in what concerns the 
monitoring and evaluation of the added value and impact of EU policies and budgetary 
instruments in migration-related domains.  
RECOMMENDATION 
Mobility Partnerships should be compliant with rule of law and fundamental 
rights principles 
As has been highlighted in section 2 of this Policy Brief, the policy tool that has been presented 
as the main (long-term) EU response to the events in the southern-mediterranean are Mobility 
Partnerships. In 2009 the CEPS JHA Section assessed the origins, nature and vulnerabilities 
inherent in these external European (soft) governance instruments in the area of migration 
management, in particular the first two Mobility Partnerships with Moldova and Cape Verde.
77  
The results of the examination revealed several deficits as regards their compatibility with the 
general principles of legal certainty and the rule of law, stemming mainly from their soft policy 
(non-legally binding) nature (constituting Joint political Declarations), the lack of democratic 
accountability (lack of involvement of the European Parliament) and their ‘flexibility’ and 
variable geometry features in terms of EU member states’ participation and actual content (the 
projects, political priorities and bilateral agreements thereby included in their annexes). Our 
analysis also highlighted the contentious relationship between Mobility Partnerships and 
international and EU labour and human rights standards (because of the predominant temporary 
and selective understanding of migration) as well as the rather unbalanced nature of the 
‘partnerships’ in question, reflected in the marked scarcity of labour and circular migration 
schemes offered by EU member states within the content of the agreements.  
We have recommended that the three Mobility Partnerships concluded so far should be subject 
to an independent assessment of their effects on the rule of law and fundamental rights of 
migrants, as well as on their actual added value, especially from the perspective of going 
beyond ‘security-related’ policies towards cooperation, projects and agreements on labour 
migration schemes. The negative repercussions of the concept of ‘circular migration’ (according 
to which migration is managed in a recurrent and temporary manner fostering some degree of 
legal mobility back and forth between two countries)
78 over a rights-based and inclusionary 
approach to migration should be also carefully considered.  
As long as Mobility Partnerships include labour-migration issues going beyond “the rights of 
member states to determine the volumes of admission of third country nationals” (quotas),
79 we 
recommend that the EU instead make use of international agreements (instead of Joint 
Declarations) as the framework of cooperation and dialogue with any third state, similar to those 
used in the context of readmission and asylum cooperation.
80 One could indeed argue that the 
recognition of the EU’s competence to legislate on ‘the internal dimension’ of labour 
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immigration policy in Article 79.4 TFEU has also opened the window for the Union to engage 
on the basis of implicit external legal competence on issues of labour immigration in its 
relations with third countries. This would be the only way to duly ensure legal certainty, policy 
coherency and the necessary democratic accountability and judicial control of their nature and 
potential effects.  
RECOMMENDATION 
The EU should develop a four-point plan to reduce irregular immigration 
Another component of the EU Global Approach to Migration has been “to effectively combat 
irregular immigration”.
81 The prevention of irregular immigration has high salience in the 
priorities of the EU’s response to migration from North Africa. Here the promotion of Europe’s 
return and readmission policy (mainly through readmission agreements with third states now 
framed in the scope of Mobility Partnerships) has constituted the main policy priority.
82 
The CEPS JHA Section identified the ‘policy gap’ which still exists between EU policies on 
irregular immigration and the findings and results of social science research projects funded by 
different directorates-general of the European Commission.
83 It recommended that EU policy 
should recognise that undocumented migrants are among the most vulnerable groups in the EU 
and that they are in fact holders of fundamental human rights. As mentioned above, the EU 
should adopt a common legislative framework of protection for the rights of all third-country 
national workers, including undocumented migrants. That framework, potentially within the 
scope of the Immigration Code or by its own Council Directive, should focus on strategies to 
overcome the practical obstacles undocumented migrants face in access to the rights of health 
care, education, housing and fair working conditions across the EU, and ensuring, inter alia, 
equal pay for equal work, decent working conditions and collective organisation. 
Our work has also highlighted the importance of official rhetoric and the negative repercussions 
of the EU’s discourse on illegality (i.e. illegal immigration) and verbs like ‘combating’, 
‘fighting’ and ‘better controlling’ irregular human movements at times of justifying restrictive 
immigration policies and perpetuating an artificial link or continuum between the human 
mobility of non-EU nationals and criminality. It was recommended that EU should change its 
discourse towards other terms such as irregular immigration and undocumented immigrants by 
adopting a common terminology that is neutral. It is noteworthy that the Commissioner for 
Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström now consistently uses the term “irregular migration” in her 
public speeches.
84 In addition, the EU should adopt a common EU manual on migration-related 
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terminology to ensure that any EU policy documents avoid this kind of rhetoric in all EU 
official languages.
85  
The CEPS JHA Section has also recommended that the Union develop a four-point plan to 
reduce irregularity in Europe and consisting of, in short, the following components:
86 
1.  EU member states should regularise (grant necessary documentation) and grant protection 
to those immigrants who cannot be returned within three months. This would also serve 
to address the “limbo situations” in which irregular migrants fall when EU member states 
acknowledge that a removal order cannot be executed but does not provide the individual 
with a residence permit. 
2.  Member states should have an obligation to deal with applications for the renewal of 
work permits in a timely manner and to enact legislation guaranteeing that between the 
application and the administrative decision, the individual has access to lawful 
employment and appeal rights. 
3.  Facilitated mechanisms for the issue of labour permits, particularly for those sectors most 
affected, should be adopted.  
4.  The EU should establish, in accordance with the provisions of international and regional 
human rights instruments, a common set of basic socio-economic rights applicable to 
everyone present in the EU. In particular, everyone present in the EU should have access 
to primary health care free of charge if necessary in order to protect the good health of 
everyone. The EU should address the vulnerability and inequalities faced by 
undocumented migrants in their access to the right to health care by explicitly including 
this group in its various policy strategies. 
RECOMMENDATION 
EU common visa policy should be guided by the principles of solidarity, 
transparency and legal certainty 
Visa policy and reciprocity have a strong political and international relations dimension. They 
must be looked at in the broader context of the EU and member states’ international relations. 
So far, EU visa policy places third states in three categories: those whose nationals need to fully 
comply with the EU visa rules, those whose nationals are altogether exempt from visa 
requirements and those whose nationals benefit from a relaxation of the visa rules. The 
Community Code on Visas sets out common procedures and conditions for issuing visas either 
for transit or intended stays of up to three months out in the member states and provides for an 
obligation for member states to motivate refusals and a right of appeal of negative decisions. 
The effective implementation of the common Visa Code should be welcomed. However, 
uniform application continues to constitute a huge challenge. It calls for a mechanism to closely 
scrutinise its consistent and harmonious implementation, in particular as regards the provisions 
related to deadlines and fees, as well as the ethical implications of cooperation with external 
service providers. Procedures for challenging negative decisions should also be available to 
those applicants who have been refused a visa. 
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Today, the EU considers its visa policy to be part of a broader vision supporting both internal 
and external policy concerns. The 2009 Stockholm programme emphasises the need to make 
access to the Union’s territory more efficient for individuals with a legitimate interest. The 
CEPS JHA Section welcomes this acknowledgement and has emphasised that any consideration 
of partnership between the EU and a country or a region should take account of the perspective 
of individuals living in these countries. It has in particular called for facilitating the movement 
of certain professionals, such as officials, diplomats, civil society actors, business persons, 
students and professors.
87 The Commission has approved this approach by announcing in the 
Dialogue Communication that it would, on a case by case basis, propose visa facilitation 
agreements to support at least “the mobility of students, researchers and business people”.
88  
The criteria for including a country in a negative visa list must be clarified and made public. 
Imposing visa conditions on the basis of nationality of the person (and hence considering an 
entire country a potential source of insecurity) is problematic, not least from the perspective of 
non-discrimination.
89 Clear roadmaps and benchmarks for being removed from such lists and 
for the country’s nationals being viewed de facto as ‘bona fide’ travellers should be also 
established.
90 
EU common visa policy constitutes a central tool for developing EU cooperation with third 
countries. The EU should only consider with caution any measure that would in effect blur this 
already complex framework. The Commission’s proposal for a temporary re-introduction of 
visa requirements for citizens of a third country could seriously affect the visibility and 
legitimacy of the common EU visa policy.
91 This is especially so when the operation of this so-
called ‘visa safeguard clause’ would be motivated by a rapid increase of asylum applications. 
The nature and content of the post-visa liberalisation mechanisms set up by the Commission 
should be further clarified and made more transparent to the potential traveller. This kind of 
‘back and forth’ on the part of the EU also detract from the credibility of the EU in its external 
relations. 
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4. Summary  of  Recommendations 
RECOMMENDATION 1 
The EU should adopt a new freezing mechanism 
Current EU infringement procedures are not sufficient to provide sound and immediate (non-
politicised) actions when fundamental rights and European freedoms are under threat. A new 
(preventive) freezing enforcement mechanism, activated by the European Commission on the 
basis of impartial evidence, would allow contested policies and practices by EU member states 
or EU agencies falling within the remit of EU law to be automatically ‘frozen’ in cases of 
actual, suspected or imminent serious breaches of fundamental rights and/or freedoms of 
individuals (such as the freedom of movement) while the legality of the case is being examined. 
The Court of Justice in Luxembourg could be also granted similar powers to those held by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg under the so-called Rule 39 
procedure. 
RECOMMENDATION 2 
The EU should ensure a closer follow up and monitoring system of temporary reintroduction 
of internal border controls 
The new Community-based mechanism to be proposed by the Commission for the coordinated 
reintroduction of internal border controls is likely to be unworkable in practice and, depending 
on the outputs during the Council negotiations, might put into question existing standards and 
legal principles in the Schengen Borders Code. The EU should focus on ensuring a closer 
follow-up and transparent monitoring system of member states’ actions when re-instating 
internal border controls under the current rules, to ensure that member states’ derogations from 
the freedom of movement principle are proportionate, adequate and necessary.  
RECOMMENDATION 3 
The EU should develop an independent, impartial and effective evaluation of national and 
EU external border control practices 
There is a ‘knowledge gap’ in the ways in which the provisions, administrative guarantees and 
fundamental rights foreseen in the SBC and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights are applied 
along the EU’s common external borders by national border authorities and Frontex (the EU 
border agency). Commission proposals to improve the Schengen evaluation mechanism will 
only go some way to ensure the independent and daily monitoring of external border practices 
and should be accompanied by the setting up of a permanent European network of inter-
disciplinary academics and/or experts to offer independent analysis of the fundamental rights 
and rule of law compliance of national practices with EU borders law.  
RECOMMENDATION 4 
Frontex should be subject to independent and democratic scrutiny/accountability 
The activities of Frontex, the EU’s border agency, suffer from a lack of transparency, solid 
accountability procedures and no clear allocation of responsibility in cases of fundamental rights 
violations. To compensate for the absence of an EU mechanism for scrutinising the impact and 
added value of Frontex activities, an independent ‘border monitor’ – independent of Frontex and 
empowered to launch disciplinary measures – should be set up to carry out a continual 
evaluation of border controls and their compatibility with the SBC, as well as joint return 
operations of irregular migrants. Current negotiations on the new Frontex Regulation offer an 
important opportunity to institute mechanisms for independent and democratic scrutiny of 
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supervisor/officer), which would be responsible for the evaluation and conduct of inspections 
focused on the protection of fundamental rights as envisaged in the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. 
RECOMMENDATION 5 
No new Database should be set up until existing ones are proved to be proportionate, safe and 
reliable – An independent evaluation/inventory and evidence-based approach 
The proliferation of large-scale IT systems and security technologies in the EU’s AFJS has 
proceeded without proper consideration of the impact on the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the individual and without adequate assessment of the proportionality, necessity, and added 
value of new systems. No new EU large-scale database should be set up until existing ones are 
found to be proportionate, safe and reliable. The EU must undertake an independent inventory 
of current policies, tools and institutional structures involved in data exchange in the field of 
security at EU level and their practical implementation. This should include an in-depth 
fundamental rights proof-reading of existing and any upcoming database. Data protection and 
‘privacy by design’ should constitute an obligatory element in the programming and running of 
any new and existing databases, which should go along with a strong and effective application 
of data protection legal standards into daily practices. 
RECOMMENDATION 6 
Europe’s Labour Immigration policy should be guided by a Rights-Based Approach – An 
Immigration Code 
The EU’s sectoral approach to labour immigration has led to an obscure and fragmented legal 
framework regarding the rights, freedoms and administrative guarantees covering third country 
nationals. The EU should support an independent inventory of this framework, itemising rights 
and standards in the field of labour market access, rights and conditions for TCNs and an 
assessment of their impact and added value in all EU countries. An immigration code, based on 
the principles of fair and equal treatment between EU citizens and all third country nationals 
and covering those categories of workers not already covered by EU legislation (such as 
irregular migrants) could help the EU to become a more active promoter of EU and international 
instruments protecting the rights of migrant workers. 
RECOMMENDATION 7 
Mobility Partnerships should be compliant with rule of law and fundamental rights principles 
– Towards international agreements 
Despite comprising a central plank of the EU’s response to events in the Southern 
Mediterranean, Mobility Partnerships reveal deficits when tested against principles of legal 
certainty, democratic accountability and international labour and human rights standards. The 
EU should instead make use of international agreements rather than non-legally binding 
declarations such as the framework of cooperation and dialogue with any third state, similar to 
those used in the context of readmission and asylum cooperation.  This would be the only way 
to duly ensure legal certainty, policy coherency and the necessary democratic accountability and 
judicial control of their nature and potential effects. The European Parliament should become a 
central actor in this dialogue and negotiations. 
RECOMMENDATION 8 
The EU should develop a Four-Point Plan to Reduce Irregular Immigration 
EU policies focused on preventing irregular immigration obscure the reality that undocumented 
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fundamental rights. EU strategies should be devised to address the ‘policy gap’ covering this 
category of individuals, focused on the following four objectives: granting of documentation 
and protection to those irregular migrants who cannot be returned; labour and appeal rights for 
migrants awaiting renewal of work permits; facilitated mechanisms for the issue of labour 
permits; and access to primary healthcare free of charge. 
RECOMMENDATION 9 
EU common visa policy should be guided by the principles of solidarity, transparency and 
legal certainty 
In order to reinforce the benefits of the Common Code on Visas, a mechanism to ensure the 
Code’s uniform and harmonious application is required. The criteria for including a country in a 
negative list should be clarified, depoliticised and made public. Finally, the Commission’s 
proposal for a temporary re-introduction of visa requirements for citizens of a third country 
could seriously affect the legitimacy and visibility of the common EU visa policy and should be 
treated with caution.   
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